Decolonial thought has wrought a devastating critique on the academy and wide-ranging fields within it. Decolonial critique entails undeniable and multiple ethico-political orientations arising from concrete struggles within the 'unfinished project of decolonization' (Maldonado-Torres), as well as recent articulations of decolonial ethics.
The Question of a Decolonial Ethics
The multiple and intersecting strands of decolonial thought have wrought a devastating critique on the academy and wide-ranging fields within it: historical and contemporary political economy, history and historiography, epistemology and orders of knowledge, and aesthetics. Decolonial critique entails undeniable and multiple ethico-political orientations arising from concrete struggles within the 'unfinished project of decolonization' and evincing the desire for new forms of relationality.
2 Decolonial scholars such as Nelson Maldonado-Torres have already begun the task of developing a decolonial ethics. 3 He critically develops Fanon's thought to reflect on the 'forms of critique and practices' that are needed to enable the unworking of the 'anti-ethical' system that is colonialism, whilst also mobilizing Enrique Dussel's earlier development of the notion of 'transmodernity', which 'transgresses' the 'abstract universals' of colonial modernity'. 4 Indeed, his mapping of what he calls the 'non-ethics of war' that distinguish modernity as an epoche, and as a set of colonial practices of violence and dehumanization, informs the engagement with the decolonial critique offered below. 5 
Dussel's newly translated Ethics of Liberation in the Age of Globalization and Exclusion builds
on his earlier philosophy of liberation to articulate an ethics on behalf of 'the victims'
and 'the poor'. Informed by his own broader contributions to decolonial thinking, Ethics is an encompassing and broadly conceived work that attempts a remarkable synthesis of normative ethics and formal morality. Engaging and incorporating insights from a vastly diverse range of ethical approaches, ranging from the 'formal morality' of discourse ethics all the way to the varied contributions of utilitarianism, communitarianism and
American pragmatism, as well as scientific accounts of affective desires shaping activist praxis, it eclectically combines elements from each to offer a foundation for an ethics of 'life... grounded in factual, empirical, and descriptive judgments'. 6 Dussel is aware that his synthetic approach opens him up to a range of criticisms, including that he collapses back onto the canon of Western modernity -onto the 'master's tools', so to speak. 7 He is less concerned with 'this ethics' explicit theoretical normative capacity' than he is with enabling their strategic mobilization 'in another dimension, which is especially important in collective learning processes where critical consciousness can be developed as part of the political, economic, and social organizing efforts of new emerging social movements in civil society'. 8 It is for this reason that, in the confines of this article, I do not rehearse the varied critiques against Dussel's approach nor seek to improve on the defenses of his work, some of them masterful. 9 I pursue a different trajectory.
I argue that, as decolonial critique, and calls for decolonial ethics, begin to find their way into broader theoretical discussions in the social sciences and humanities, it may be more fruitful to insist on the question of decolonial ethics. Rather than incorporating elements of decolonial critique or 'translating' these important attempts at decolonial ethics into our familiar ethical theories, I urge that we retain decolonial thought's disruption of prevalent figurations, languages and ways of thinking about 'ethics', which remain bound to forms of ethical expression that are themselves dependent on generalized narratives of who we are as ethical subjects. As decolonial thought has shown, narratives of ethical subjectivity tend to occlude their histories of violent and racialized exclusion of multiplicity and, at times, legitimate colonial structures and their imbrication in the 'differential allocation of humanness'. 10 Dussel too recognizes the danger of such translations into our familiar languages of ethics: 'the philosophical ethics most in fashion, the standard ones, and even those that have a critical orientation with a claim to being postconventional in character, are in fact themselves the ethics of minorities (most 6 Dussel, Ethics of Liberation, xvi-xvii. 7 Cf. discussions of this in the essays found in Lewis R. emphatically of hegemonic, dominating minorities; those that own the resources, the words, the arguments, the capital, the armies)'.
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Instead, I offer here a discussion of what we might call the prolegomena to any future decolonial ethics: the preceding, insufficient but necessary, orientations that call for new ways of narrating, world-disclosure and praxis in the world with others. The prolegomena is not intended as a prohibitive move but, rather, as a caution to 'hasty' translations of decolonial thought, including the important articulations of decolonial ethics noted above, through the traditions of ethical theorizing most familiar to us in political and international thought and cognate academic domains. The discussion of the prolegomena recognizes that conventional and critical -relational, situational, nonfoundational --approaches to ethics too, often depend on, or return to, the self-same figurations of ethical subjectivity that they genuinely seek to question, or even, annul. In section one, I outline the contours of decolonial critique as the first element to the prolegomena of any future decolonial ethics, documenting its examination of the 'idea of race' as an organizing principle of the new division of labour in colonialism and noting its development of the concept of coloniality in the analysis of the 'afterlife' of historical colonialism. In this critique, the thought of Wynter offers one important avenue for unworking humanistic, biocentric and homo oeconomicus subjectivities as the very narrative vehicle of both colonial practices of dispossession and de-humanizing disposability and also of modern ethical thinking. 16 This figure, whom Wynter calls 'Man', is incessantly established as the world's 'referent-we' and is the preeminent subjectivity at the center of many conventional and critical constructions of ethics. Leaving in place and, in effect, naturalizing this subject reinforces our silence as to its 'epistemic privilege'
and its epistemic and other forms of injustice in the global colonial era.
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The plural and intersecting decolonial critiques at the heart of our emerging discussions of decolonial ethics also call for, and enable, the search for a decolonizing and worldly poetics as the second element of the prolegomena. structured 'the basic experience of colonial domination', it also continued to permeate 'the more important dimensions of global power, including its specific rationality:
Eurocentrism'. 31 This racial axis of colonialism, Quijano emphasized, was to prove 'more durable and stable than the colonialism in whose matrix it was established'; he insisted therefore on analyzing how 'the model of power that is globally hegemonic today presupposes an element of coloniality'. 32 In highlighting the 'coloniality of power' -the afterlife, if you like, of colonial models of power 'tied up to the concentration in Europe of capital, wages, the market of capital, and finally, the society and culture associated with those determinations' 33 --he opened a way for analyzing how claims of European cultural achievement were a naturalized aspect of the coloniality of power.
Thinkers like Walter Mignolo, Maldonado-Torres and Wynter later explored contemporary forms of coloniality as a logic and a 'hidden agenda' of modernity, 34 which works to actively erase its role in colonialism through the production of knowledge and 'culture'. Coloniality's assumptions that the colonized were not 'able to get by without Europe's theoretical or cultural achievements' became 'one of the most definitive tenets of modernity'. 35 Becoming aware of coloniality --first of power (Quijano), then of Being 
Maldonado-Torres's definition is illuminating:
Coloniality…refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breath For example, her problematization of the myth of 1492, Columbus's 'discovery' of America, excavates how white European man as ethical subject understands his propter nos -his 'for the sake of us' prescriptions 'as if this well-being were isomorphic with that of mankind'. 64 The ethical subject evinces 'generalized modes of altruism', which are 'induced by our symbolically coded, and therefore cultural, programs, together with the specific moral-ethical imperatives that these programs put into play'. 65 Wynter charts how our identifications with others are tied to 'helping those with whom we are languagingly (and therefore narratively) coidentified, through the mediation of each such program, their founding narratives, tropes of figuration and the symbolically coded order of consciousness to which they give rise'. 66 'Ethical' subjects, then, have no prior commitment, either a priori empathetic or rationally deduced, to others. Rather, 'coidentifiers' can view others with a neutrality or disinterestedness which is 'potentially amoral to those who are outside…the "common universe of obligation"'. 67 At Wynter shares Glissant's poetic intention to diversify, pluralize and privilege hybrid/complex modes of renarrating and re-fashioning ourselves, concretely 'disalienating' our colonial selves whilst struggling for decolonization in society and knowledge. 90 Glissant finds in Antilleanity and processes of creolization, an ethos of irreverence towards 'our present mode of being, of subjectivity, the Self' 91 and the 'very system of figuration'. 92 He discusses the priority of 'degeneralization', comprising at a minimum an attentive attitude towards specificity and experience, for poetic revolt;
'degeneralization', Glissant insists, seeks to find both the specificities of our colonial experiences and also the 'total (dreamed-of) freedom of the connections amongst them, Second, committed to errantry, his poetics is at once itinerant and nomadic whilst differentiating itself from the targeted nomadism of the conqueror's settler colonialism. 99
Errantry entails 'a real change' in direction, 100 and remains wedded to multiplicities. As such, it suspends both the historical trajectories of arrowlike nomadism of colonial conquest from centre to periphery and also dreams of a 'trip in the opposite direction' from periphery to centre; and even anticipates the abolition of the trajectory itself, becoming 'curved. The poet's word leads from periphery to periphery' in a 'circular nomadism' that 'makes every periphery into a center': indeed, it 'abolishes the very notion of center and periphery'. 101 Rather than charting trajectories, it 'interweaves and no longer projects…it inscribes itself in a circularity' which is a practice of 'a self-break and reconnection' that links to uprisings, poetic and political, of decolonization. 102 Third, Glissant charts his own path towards a poetics of relation attuned, following Césaire, to the totality and opacity of the world as relation, whose practice disavows the 'arrowlike' poetics of colonialism, based on the universalization / generalization of 'root identities'. 103 Such a poetics works 'in stages, in obscure and extracted strata, opens the being onto his lived relativities…No, it doesn't reveal; it unveils with gravity'. 104 What does it unveil? '[T]he unique, the particular, the flash principle of each community to the patience of its soon to be declared relationship to the Other'; as such it emerges out of the histories of colonization and creolization -'suffered in the drama of the world': 'it is for us Poetics of the being that is finding itself'. 105 Relation is an orientation and an ethos, it 'functions somewhat like an intransitive verb' such that it is invoked without the at one and the same time. 113 Glissant speaks of 'the shock of elsewhere', which 'distinguishes the poet' who defends against 'assimilations' desired by the perspective of the 'European here'. 114 Wynter herself calls for a more broadly conceived 'deciphering practice…linked to an ongoing cultural revolution of an emergent global and popular imaginary for which the securing of the well-being of the concrete individual human subject is the referent telos'. 115 Multiple forms of poetic specificity are needed to decentre the 'systemic subject' --authored and authorized by the overrepresentation of Man. 116 Such a decolonizing poetics --hybrid, locally situated --must ensure that Western thought is 'viewed "from another landscape" by its Western, and indeed in our case Westernized, bearer subjects'. 117 In this sense, anti-colonial politics, like any politics, 'is in the telling'. 118 As Celia Britton notes, in encompassing multiple simultaneous meanings (polysemy) and occupying different forms and purposes at once (polyvalence), 'poetics cannot therefore be readily accommodated within the boundaries of mainstream academic philosophy'. 119 Poetics not only resists, not only thinks anew, but charts paths away from (rational) Inspired by the decolonial potential of the 'original heresy' of humanism, Wynter calls for to a 'revisioned' 'dissonant, a non-identitarian, but nevertheless comprehensive and planetary humanism' made, after Césaire, to the 'measure of the world'. 142 Wynter is attracted to the heretical potential of humanism's 'Studia Humanitatis' that 'de-godded'
humanity and the order of knowledge itself. It is in the heresy of a new Studia where she locates the autopoetic overturn of Man and the praxis of being hybridly human, in fuller recognition of humans as 'hybridly biological and symbolic beings'. 143 The metaphor for the autopoetic overturn, and the impulse for the Studia itself, is the 'Ceremony' that must be found to allow Othello to marry Desdemona, in other words, the resources with which we can intellectually breach the '"Color Line's" divide'. 144 Revisiting her well-known 1984 'Ceremony Must Be Found' essay, Wynter reorients both the answer to the question of who we are and the content of the new Studia around the search for a newly understood humanist praxis of 'the We-the-ecumenically-Human', in and recast the hybrid and (post)humanist multiplicity of 'the We-the-ecumenicallyHuman', away from singular and privileged substance, and towards a recognition that 'our being human as "always a doing" of our being human as praxis'. 147 At a minimum, such a praxis, Wynter has shown, takes our human narrating and storytelling --as homo narrans --as an integral aspect of 'the imperatively artificially co-identifying, eusocial species that we are'. 148 As noted above, a humanist praxis of 'the We-the-ecumenically-Human' would entail hybridly human in a shared world. In other words, a newly heretic Studia outlines the contours of an 'education' that 'leads us back to ourselves' to multiple 'realm[s] of the human sojourn' 168 in our opacity and errant playfulness, historically captured and reduced through 'thingification' by colonial modernity. This is related, I argue, to forms of access to the world, and others within it, which problematize masterful yet partial revealings of the world and ourselves according to the operability and use of others as decolonization. As Shilliam argues, this should not be understood as a role that privileges academic knowledge production as 'more mobile and hence more universalizable than particular context-specific 'lay' interpretations', 180 whose 'priestly caste' of academics reduce 'living knowledge traditions of the colonized' to 'cultures', which 'are pronounced dead on arrival in the present'. 181 Resisting the Western academy's 'epistemic division between knowledge production and knowledge cultivation', 182 we might argue for a supporting, rather than a guiding, role for academics, which 'supports spiritual, intellectual and political commitments' as they gestate within the 'global infrastructure of anti-colonial connectivity'. 183 Dussell, too, has a cognate view of knowledge-making. He regards philosophers, scholars and academics to be but 'analytical transcribers or rearguard theorists, not inventors or originators so much as those who give philosophical articulation to the ideas embedded in the praxis and lived experience of the activist oppressed.' 184 Obsolescence of knowledge-making hierarchies, then, is an aspect of a praxis of being ecumenically human: it accepts as equal knowers, thinkers and knowledge-makers --'co-creative or self-determining in this intellectual process' --those engaged in struggle and acknowledges the 'contemporaneous and epistemically valid communities struggling other-wise to cultivate their living knowledge traditions while making a claim on humanity'. 185 This democratizes who makes knowledge, but does not claim that 'living knowledge traditions -even those of the oppressed' are 'good' or 'bad before the fact'; indeed, as Shilliam goes on to explain they contain struggles and multiple tendencies that are regressive and progressive according to their own complex value systems that already weave outwards and spiral inwards so as to speak with and make claims on behalf of humanity. But this "complicating" or "troubling" fact is extraneous to the emphasis that I am placing, in principle, on a democratisation of knowledge cultivation instead of an extended critique of knowledge production. 
